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per student funding for K-12 education. Using empirical data collected and analyzed by the Institute on 
Taxation and Economic Policy (ITEP), this paper first utilizes a bivariate correlation matrix and then an 
ordinary least squares regression model to explain if tax code regressivity, or any other controlled 
variables, have any impact over spending per student in K-12 education by the state. The findings do not 
support the hypothesis that regressive state tax codes lead to less spending per student on K-12 
education. 
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Blaming Mr. Taxman Do Regressive State Tax Codes Impact K-12 Education Spending Per 
Student? 
Alex Stogin 
Abstract: This paper seeks to understand the impact that state tax code structuring has on a 
state’s ability to fund K-12 education using a multiple regression model to evaluate the 
regressivity of a state’s tax code on it’s per student funding for K-12 education. Using empirical 
data collected and analyzed by the Institute on Taxation and Economic Policy (ITEP), this paper 
first utilizes a bivariate correlation matrix and then an ordinary least squares regression model 
to explain if tax code regressivity, or any other controlled variables, have any impact over 
spending per student in K-12 education by the state. The findings do not support the hypothesis 
that regressive state tax codes lead to less spending per student on K-12 education. 
 
Introduction 
 Over the last several decades, a number of factors have been studied and written about 
addressing the quality of education and the number of tax dollars that go to fund that education. 
The desire for more modernized schools, a necessity to become more competitive on a global 
scale, and high-profile disagreements on how public schools should be funded have all led to 
vigorous debates on how the state should finance and provide an education to America’s youth. 
Although some may look to the federal government in terms of K-12 education funding, the 
Constitution allots the responsibility of education to the states.   
 At the state level, one of the largest debates occurring is whether states should be 
spending more or less on K-12 education. Questions remain as to whether more money per 
student leads to better quality education and higher levels of achievement. State legislatures 
across the country need to decide annually what level they want invest tax-money into their 
public-school system. Other explanatory factors on state spending per student exist as well, such 
as a state’s “cultural value” they place on education, political pressure from voters, and the 
education level of a the state’s electorate. While this paper will review previous research into the 
impact of increased funding on achievement, and several other factors listed above, the goal of 
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this research is to examine the ability of a state to finance greater levels of spending on 
education.   
 This paper attempts to address how the structure of a state’s tax code impacts the state’s 
ability to fund K-12 education. This research will not attempt to answer the question as to 
whether more money spent by the state has positive, negative, or neutral implications on 
academic achievement, rather I will assume that spending more money per student will likely not 
have a negative impact on academic achievement. This paper will look to advise state legislators 
on which tax code structures best enable them to further fund education spending per student. I 
will be using the Institute on Taxation and Economic Policy’s (ITEP) tax inequality index 
against the National Education Association’s (NEA) spending per student data table to examine 
if a relationship exists between tax code regressivity and K-12 spending per student across all 50 
states and the District of Columbia (D.C.).  
The hypothesis is that as a state’s tax code becomes more regressive, K-12 education 
spending per student will decline. The theory behind this hypothesis is based on the idea that 
more regressive tax structures will inadequately equip states with the ability to fund education 
per student at sufficient levels.  
Literature Review 
 Although this research will avoid the question of money’s impact on academic 
achievement, it is important to recognize the ongoing debate as to whether increased funding per 
student leads to better results in the classroom. The results have been mixed regarding this 
question. 
 Several studies have both supported and cast doubt on the impact of money on 
achievement. Picus and Robillard (2000) concluded that there is no link between school spending 
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and academic achievement. They helped confirm a 1996 study by authors Murnane and Levy 
who also found that increased funding or resources did not lead to greater academic success.  
 However, there have been studies conducted which have concluded that increased 
funding can lead to better academic results. Verstegen and King (1998), Sebold (1981) and Card 
and Payne (2002) found modest, but statistically significant, connections between increased 
funding for K-12 education and academic achievement of students. Figlio (1997) took a different 
approach and studied 49 states and how property tax limitations on school services impacted 
academic achievement. Figlio found that when states limited how much property tax could be  
spent on school services, academic achievement declined as school district funding was  
restricted. In addition to Figlio’s research, Wenglinsky (1997) found an indirect relationship  
between a school district’s economic resources to fund school services and academic  
achievement. Wenglinsky stated: 
“The study tested the notion that through a certain ‘path,’ certain economic resources are 
associated with academic achievement. The path begins with the hypothesis that per-
pupil expenditures on instruction and the administration of school districts’ central 
offices are positively related to class size, with more spending leading to smaller classes. 
Class size is, in turn, positively related to school social environment, with schools having 
more cohesive social environments when they have smaller classes. Finally, cohesive 
school environments are positively related to students’ achievement above and beyond 
students’ social backgrounds.”  
While this debate has yet to be settled, this supports the assumption that increased spending may 
not actually increase student academic performance, it does no harm. As research into this issue 
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continues, this paper will look to better inform legislators of tax code implications on their state’s 
education spending and educational outcomes. 
Research Design and Methodology 
 To research the effect of tax code regressivity on K-12 education spending per student 
across the 50 states, I used the ITEP’s tax inequality index as a baseline to measure tax 
regressivity. The ITEP’s tax inequality index factors in a variety taxes across each state such as 
state income tax, property tax, sales and excise taxes, and estate tax. The index then calculates a 
state tax system’s effect on income inequality between the bottom 20% of earners, the middle 
60% of earners, and the top 1% from pre-tax income to post-tax income (Who Pays, 2015). 
Negative values indicate that income inequality grows under the state’s tax system while positive 
values indicate that income inequality shrinks under the state’s tax system. Thus, if inequality 
rises, the regressivity of a state’s tax system rises. This study use ITEP’s inequality index as a 
measure because it is the only index that has created one uniform standard across each state that 
takes into consideration all taxes of the state, excluding federal taxes.  
 This index was ideal for several reasons. First, while there is a misconception that income 
taxes drive inequality, the most regressive states see their regressivity come mostly from sales 
and excise taxes, and property taxes. Therefore, it was imperative that any measure of 
regressivity include the impact of taxes beyond income tax. Secondly, each state draws from 
different tax revenue sources to fund its K-12 education; often income taxes don’t go towards 
education spending. Therefore, using only income taxes as a measure of regressivity wouldn’t 
have been as accurate a measure as including multiple prominent tax sources across each state. 
Finally, the ITEP was able distinguish between state and local taxes and factor them together into 
one index. Local taxes have an almost equal part to state taxes in paying for K-12 education 
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spending and have an important role in either increasing or decreasing a state’s overall tax 
inequality  
 Next it was determined to how to best measure K-12 education spending by the state. It 
became clear that measuring the amount of money spent per student would an accurate measure 
that could be easily understood. A variable often used to judge a school’s quality is the amount 
of funding it receives per student currently enrolled and this measure controls for variance in the 
population. This data was collected from the NEA for funding per student for enrollments in the 
Fall 2016 (Rankings and Estimates).  
 Lastly, 15 additional control variables were introduced to the bivariate correlation matrix 
in addition to the least squares regression model. Those variables were: K-12 education spending 
per capita (Rankings and Estimates), percentage of adult population with a high school diploma, 
percentage of adult population with a bachelor’s degree, percentage African American 
population, percentage Hispanic population (Population Distribution by Race/Ethnicity, 2017), 
median household income, poverty rate (Poverty USA), number of operating school districts 
(Rankings and Estimates), percentage of K-12 education funding provided by the federal 
government, state government and local governments (Grant Distribution Formulas), percentage 
of Republicans in the state legislature, party of the governor, (2017 State & Legislative Partisan 
Composition), urbanization, cost of living index, and state political culture.  
 Two separate tests were conducted, each with two sub-tests to evaluate the impact of 
each of these variables on K-12 education spending per student. The two initial tests varied 
between including or excluding D.C. from the data. Each of these tests consisted of first 
producing a bivariate correlation matrix between all variables.  This matrix was used to begin 
addressing any multicollinearity issues. Any correlation of .7 or above was noted, and a 
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correlation threshold of .84 was established to remove a variable. Variables were removed based 
on theoretical relevance to the hypothesis.  
 The remaining variables will then be put through several rounds of ordinary least squares 
regressions, removing variables each round until all multicollinearity issues were removed. The 
sub-tests involved two different treatments for these missing values. Sub-test “A” for each test 
would exclude the missing cases listwise while sub-test “B” would replace the missing values 
with the mean of that variable’s dataset. For each test and its sub-tests, multicollinearity was 
measured by both the variable’s tolerance and variance inflation factor (VIF) measures. A 
threshold of less than 2.0 for tolerance, and greater than 5.0 for VIF was set to remove a variable. 
One variable would be removed each time a regression was run until no variables remaining met 
the established threshold. Variables were removed first based on tolerance, and VIF measures 
with the variable with the lowest tolerance and highest VIF score being removed. If two 
variables were within .01 of each for either score, the one with less theoretical importance was 
removed. The final regression model would be the one where no variables met the established 
multicollinearity threshold and results would be extrapolated from that model.  
Test 1, which included D.C., had seven bivariate correlations that exceeded .7, and two 
that exceed the .84 threshold (Table 1). K-12 spending per capita and percentage of school 
funding from local governments were removed from further testing. Spending per capita was 
removed because it was too closely correlated with spending per student, the primary dependent 
variable of this research. Local government spending was removed because it was almost 
identically correlated with funding from state governments. Given that this research is focused 
primarily at the state level, local government funding was removed. Test 1 was then split in to 
Test 1A and Test 1B.   
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Test 1A went through four rounds of ordinary least squares regression modeling before 
multicollinearity was lowered to a satisfactory level within the established threshold. Poverty 
rate, median household income, and percentage of adults with high school diplomas were 
removed in that order during the first three rounds (Table 2). Round four saw no 
multicollinearity issues and results collected (Table 7). 
Test 1B underwent three rounds of ordinary least squares regression modeling before 
multicollinearity was lowered to a satisfactory level within the established threshold. Median 
household income and percentage of adults with high school diplomas were removed in that 
order during the first two rounds (Table 3). Round three saw no multicollinearity issues and 
results were drawn from there (Table 8). 
Test 2, which excluded D.C., had eight bivariate correlations that exceeded .7 and three 
that exceed the .84 threshold (Table 4). K-12 spending per capita, percentage of school funding 
from local governments and poverty rate were removed from further testing. As noted for Test 1, 
spending per capita was removed because it correlated too closely with spending per student. 
Also, as specified earlier for Test 1, local government spending was removed because it was 
almost identically correlated with funding from state governments. Poverty rate was removed 
because it was too closely related to median household income, median income was theorized to 
play a more direct role in funding education so it was kept. Test 2 was then split in to Test 2A 
and Test 2B.   
Tests 2A and 2B underwent three rounds of ordinary least squares regression modeling 
before multicollinearity was lowered to a satisfactory level within the established threshold. 
Median household income and percentage of adults with high school diplomas were removed in 
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that order during the first two rounds for both sub-tests (Tables 5 & 6). Round three saw no 
multicollinearity issues for either sub-test and results collected (Tables 9 & 10).  
Results and Analysis 
In order to evaluate the hypothesis, the final round of regression from each subtest was 
used to account for the significance between my variables and the strength of any relationships. 
The established significance level threshold was .05 for all testing.  
Table 7 shows the final regression model results for Test 1A. The final model had an R 
value of .754, an R-Squared of .569, an Adjusted R-Square of .425, and Significance of .001. 
After removing issues of multicollinearity, Test 1A found no significant relationships at the .05 
level.  
Table 8 shows the final regression model results for Test 1B. After removing issues of 
multicollinearity, Test 1B found no significant relationships at the .05 level. The model had an R 
value of .778, an R-Squared of .605, an Adjusted R-Square of .466 (.480 if poverty rate is 
removed), and Significance of .000. However, an additional variable, poverty rate, was removed 
to replicate the variables removed in Test 1A. Upon removing poverty rate, the cost of living 
index and percentage of adults with bachelor’s degrees became significant at the .05 level, with 
beta weights of .348 and .381 respectively.  
Table 9 shows the final regression model results for Test 2A. The model has a R value of 
.754, an R-Squared of .569, an Adjusted R-Square of .425, and Significance of .001. After 
removing issues of multicollinearity, there were no significant relationships at the .05 level. 
Table 10 shows the final regression model results for Test 2B. The model has an R value 
of .752, an R-Squared of .566, an Adjusted R-Square of .425, and Significance of .001. After 
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removing issues of multicollinearity, there was one significant relationships at the .05 level. The 
Cost of living index was significant at the .05 level, with a beta weight of .405.  
Across all testing conducted, I am unable to reject my null hypothesis. I am unable to 
draw any assumptions that a state’s tax system has any impact on how much that state funds 
K-12 education spending per student. While the cost of living index was significant in Tests 1B 
and 2B and percentage of adults with bachelor’s degrees was significant in Test 1B, a degree of 
skepticism should be maintained about their true impact on education spending as well.  
In Test 1B, after all multicollinearity measures fell outside the established threshold for 
variable removal, there were no significant variables. Only after I removed an additional 
variable, poverty rate, out of intellectual curiosity and to mirror Test 1A’s removals, did cost of 
living and adult college education become significant. Only in Test 2B was cost of living index 
significant after following my research design as established. In Test 2B, the data excluded D.C. 
from being considered and replaced missing values for variables with the mean of that variable 
rather than excluding those cases. I raise this observation because the few values that were 
missing from the dataset were for percentage of Republicans in the state legislature, and the party 
of the governor. When analyzing tax codes, cross-sectional variables of the party makeup of a 
state legislator and governor’s party were not best suited for this study, because tax codes are 
developed and changed infrequently over-time. To put the entire current tax system of a state on 
one year’s state legislature and governor is not as accurate as looking at party control of a state 
over time. Replacing the missing values of those variables with the mean may have had a 
disproportionate impact on the significance of the other variables.  
However, if my previous comments are disregarded for a moment, there could be 
theoretical reasons why cost of living index was able to become significant in its own right. 
RES PUBLICA XXIII │139 
 
Given that education quality was ignored in this study, my regression models would have held 
quality constant across the 50 states and D.C. It makes sense that as the cost of living in a state 
increases, the costs associated with operating a school will as well. Needing to pay higher 
salaries to staff, increased supply costs, increased overhead would naturally require states to pay 
more money per student for the same quality education in a state with a higher cost of living than 
a state with a lower cost of living. Receiving the same educational experience in Alabama 
compared to in Massachusetts would theoretically cost more in the latter compared to the former 
due to their vast difference in cost of living. Future research will be needed to confirm if this 
theory holds any empirical reality.  
Conclusion 
Through this research, I was unable to reject my null hypothesis. However, there is room 
for improvement in this research that could yield more fruitful results. Future research should 
consider incorporating party control of each state over time. Looking at state party control over 
time may lend more insight to party influence over both the tax code and to K-12 education 
spending. In addition, factoring in party and ideology of the state’s electorate could identify more 
clearly the role partisanship plays in both tax and education policy of the states. There may also 
be benefits to adding in quality of education as a variable to analyze how money impacts quality 
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Table 1: Bivariate Correlations >0.7 with D.C. 
Correlated Variables Pearson Correlation Values 
Per Student Spending & Per Capita Spending .852** 
High School Diploma & Poverty Rate -.787** 
High School Diploma & Political Culture .707** 
Bachelor’s Degree & Median Household Income .769** 
Poverty Rate & Median Household Income -.813** 
State Government Funding & Local Government Funding -.974** 
Cost of Living Index & Percent Republican in State Leg. -.773** 
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Table 2: Test 1A Multicollinearity Regression Model Results 
 Round 1 Round 2 Round 3 Final Round 
Variable Tolerance VIF Tolerance VIF Tolerance VIF Tolerance VIF 
Tax Inequality 
Index 
.729 1.371 .731 1.369 .737 1.356 .747 1.339 
High School 
Diploma 
.104 9.588 .137 7.308 .144 6.953 - - 
Bachelor’s 
Degree 
.138 7.257 .139 7.194 .193 5.187 .311 3.216 
African 
American Pop. 
.283 3.539 .284 3.523 .285 3.515 .436 2.295 




.084 11.855 .126 7.964 - - - - 
Poverty Rate .083 12.004 - - - - - - 
Operating 
School Districts 
.716 1.398 .730 1.370 .730 1.369 .814 1.228 
State Gov 
Funding 
.734 1.363 .753 1.329 .758 1.318 .780 1.281 
Federal Gov 
Funding 
.371 2.695 .469 2.132 .469 2.130 .491 2.037 
State Leg. 
Republican 
.236 4.244 .236 4.238 .289 3.464 .314 3.182 
Governor’s 
Party 
.660 1.514 .684 1.462 .693 1.443 .723 1.384 
Urbanization .245 4.078 .247 4.061 .297 3.364 .330 3.030 
Cost of Living .199 5.035 .200 5.012 .307 3.257 .308 3.245 
Political 
Culture 
.329 3.041 .329 3.041 .331 3.026 .398 2.511 
See Appendix B for SPSS data table 
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Table 3: Test 1B Multicollinearity Regression Model Results 
 Round 1 Round 2 Final Round 
Variable Tolerance VIF Tolerance VIF Tolerance VIF 
Tax Inequality Index .717 1.395 .720 1.389 .721 1.387 
High School Diploma .113 8.811 .114 8.776 - - 
Bachelor’s Degree .107 9.311 .166 6.041 .242 4.129 
African American Pop. .218 4.593 .219 4.569 .308 3.246 
Hispanic Pop. .220 4.549 .221 4.532 .340 2.943 
Median Household Income .085 11.744 - - - - 
Poverty Rate .106 9.427 .154 6.482 .202 4.940 
Operating School Districts .716 1.397 .720 1.390 .773 1.293 
State Gov Funding .613 1.633 .620 1.612 .629 1.589 
Federal Gov Funding .379 2.637 .401 2.491 .466 2.145 
State Leg. Republican .215 4.659 .243 4.115 .244 4.100 
Governor’s Party .698 1.432 .699 1.431 .710 1.409 
Urbanization .234 4.272 .279 3.578 .292 3.421 
Cost of Living .208 4.808 .252 3.963 .286 3.499 
Political Culture .331 3.024 .331 3.023 .363 2.755 
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Table 4: Bivariate Correlations >0.7 without D.C. 
Correlated Variables Pearson Correlation Values 
Per Student Spending & Per Capita Spending .846** 
High School Diploma & Poverty Rate -.803** 
High School Diploma & Political Culture .728** 
Bachelor’s Degree & Median Household Income .832** 
Poverty Rate & Median Household Income -.863** 
State Government Funding & Local Government Funding -.968** 
Cost of Living Index & Percent Republican in State Leg. -.773** 
Bachelor’s Degree & Poverty Rate -.726** 
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Table 5: Test 2A Multicollinearity Regression Model Results 
 Round 1 Round 2 Final Round 
Variable Tolerance VIF Tolerance VIF Tolerance VIF 
Tax Inequality Index .731 1.369 .737 1.356 .747 1.339 
High School Diploma .137 7.308 .144 6.953 - - 
Bachelor’s Degree .139 7.194 .193 5.187 .311 3.216 
African American Pop. .284 3.523 .285 3.515 .436 2.295 
Hispanic Pop. .212 4.717 .213 4.704 .377 2.654 
Median Household Income .126 7.964 - - - - 
Operating School Districts .730 1.370 .730 1.369 .814 1.228 
State Gov Funding .753 1.329 .758 1.318 .780 1.281 
Federal Gov Funding .469 2.132 .469 2.130 .491 2.037 
State Leg. Republican .236 4.238 .289 3.464 .314 3.182 
Governor’s Party .684 1.462 .693 1.443 .723 1.384 
Urbanization .247 4.041 .297 3.364 .330 3.030 
Cost of Living .200 5.012 .307 3.257 .308 3.245 
Political Culture .329 3.041 .331 3.026 .398 2.511 
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Table 6: Test 2B Multicollinearity Regression Model Results 
 Round 1 Round 2 Final Round 
Variable Tolerance VIF Tolerance VIF Tolerance VIF 
Tax Inequality Index .739 1.352 .745 1.342 .751 1.331 
High School Diploma .141 7.101 .149 6.692 - - 
Bachelor’s Degree .144 6.940 .199 5.021 .312 3.207 
African American Pop. .281 3.554 .282 3.547 .442 2.263 
Hispanic Pop. .216 4.620 .217 4.611 .377 2.654 
Median Household Income .126 7.927 - - - - 
Operating School Districts .729 1.371 .730 1.371 .821 1.218 
State Gov Funding .769 1.300 .774 1.293 .787 1.271 
Federal Gov Funding .477 2.095 .478 2.091 .493 2.029 
State Leg. Republican .249 4.017 .303 3.295 .323 3.093 
Governor’s Party .678 1.475 .687 1.456 .719 1.391 
Urbanization .250 4.001 .299 3.344 .330 3.030 
Cost of Living .203 4.916 .312 3.204 .315 3.170 
Political Culture .337 2.966 .338 2.954 .400 2.499 
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Table 7: Final Test 1A Regression Model Results 
Variable Significance Beta Weight 
Tax Inequality Index .536 .079 
Bachelor’s Degree .198 .258 
African American Pop. .861 -.029 
Hispanic Pop. .314 -.182 
Operating School Districts .278 .134 
State Gov Funding .713 .046 
Federal Gov Funding .074 -.287 
State Leg. Republican .372 -.176 
Governor’s Party .473 .093 
Urbanization .318 -.193 
Cost of Living .061 .381 
Political Culture .182 -.236 
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Table 8: Final Test 1B Regression Model Results 
Variable Significance Beta Weight 
Tax Inequality Index .504 .082 
Bachelor’s Degree .080* .378 
African American Pop. .959 -.010 
Hispanic Pop. .307 -.184 
Poverty Rate .973 -.008 
Operating School Districts .271 .131 
State Gov Funding .694 .052 
Federal Gov Funding .135 -.231 
State Leg. Republican .373 -.189 
Governor’s Party .445 .095 
Urbanization .350 -.181 
Cost of Living .082* .345 
Political Culture .177 -.236 
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Table 9: Final Test 2A Regression Model Results 
Variable Significance Beta Weight 
Tax Inequality Index .536 .079 
Bachelor’s Degree .198 .258 
African American Pop. .861 -.029 
Hispanic Pop. .314 -.182 
Operating School Districts .278 .134 
State Gov Funding .713 .046 
Federal Gov Funding .074 -.287 
State Leg. Republican .372 -.176 
Governor’s Party .473 .093 
Urbanization .318 -.193 
Cost of Living .061 .381 
Political Culture .182 -.236 
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Table 10: Final Test 2B Regression Model Results 
Variable Significance Beta Weight 
Tax Inequality Index .566 .072 
Bachelor’s Degree .182 .264 
African American Pop. .934 -.014 
Hispanic Pop. .313 -.181 
Operating School Districts .246 .141 
State Gov Funding .634 .059 
Federal Gov Funding .084 -.274 
State Leg. Republican .419 -.156 
Governor’s Party .492 .089 
Urbanization .316 -.192 
Cost of Living .043* .405 
Political Culture .191 -.228 
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